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“UNITING FOR PEACE” AND HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: THE AUTHORISING FUNCTION OF 
THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Michael Ramsden†
Abstract: Although the end of the Cold War has seen the functional 
expansion of the United Nations Security Council, concerns still remain over its
legitimacy, driven in part by its failure to address serious and persistent human rights 
abuses. While this has resurrected arguments in favour of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention outside the U.N. Charter framework, little attention has been paid to how the 
U.N. General Assembly may authorise such enforcement action under a U.N. mandate 
through the invocation of the Uniting for Peace mechanism. Some dismiss Uniting for 
Peace as little more than a relic of the Cold War, but, if properly conceived, the General 
Assembly may authorise a humanitarian intervention where the Security Council is 
deadlocked and has failed to accomplish its primary responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security. This article will consider the constitutional foundations 
of the Uniting for Peace resolution and the scope for the General Assembly to assume 
analogous functions to that of the Security Council in authorising enforcement action.
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Security Council (Council) is, by any legal 
measure, an extraordinary institution. Possessing a broad power to render 
mandatory decisions that bind members of the United Nations (U.N.), it may 
also authorise measures up to and including forcible coercive action where it 
determines there is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression.” 1 In discharging its “primary responsibility” of maintaining
international peace and security, the Council has embraced a teleological 
interpretation of its mandatory and coercive powers under the U.N. Charter 
to address diverse security concerns. The expansion of the Council’s 
constitutional powers following the end of the Cold War has included the 
introduction of measures aimed at compelling the seizure of assets belonging 
† Associate Professor; Assistant Dean (Research), Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong; Director, Centre for Rights and Justice (michaelramsden@cuhk.edu.hk). 
1 See U.N. Charter arts. 39–42.  The Council is one of six principal organs of the U.N., alongside 
the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court 
of Justice, and the Secretariat. The Council comprises fifteen Members: five of whom are permanent 
(United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and France).  The other ten members of the Council are 
appointed on a non-permanent basis and hold their place for two-year terms. U.N. Charter art. 23.  The 
Council is commonly regarded as the “executive” arm of the U.N. given that it possesses binding powers 
and a membership of states who are often able to ensure effective implementation.  For further discussion 
of the Council’s structure and powers, see EDWARD C. LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL: PRACTICE AND 
PROMISE (2006); NEIL FENTON, UNDERSTANDING THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: COERCION OR CONSENT?
(2004).
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to terrorists, the creation of international ad hoc tribunals, the power to make 
a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the ability to qualify 
a humanitarian crisis as a “threat to the peace” even without any apparent 
cross-border security dimension to the crisis.2
Despite the impressive growth in the Council’s activities after the end 
of the Cold War, its legitimacy remains in question.3 Although legitimacy 
may be measured in different ways, one concern in particular continues to 
resonate: the perceived “misuse” of the veto in situations involving serious 
human rights abuse, arising where permanent members act in their own 
national interest instead of in a manner that best promotes the protection of 
human rights and international security. The failure of the Council to avert 
genocide in Rwanda or to exert any meaningful influence over the 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo prompted discussion on the continued 
suitability of the U.N. collective security framework in an era where human 
rights go beyond mere abstract moral claims to having a universal (erga 
omnes) character.4
The responsibility to protect (RtoP) doctrine, a set of principles 
proposed in a 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, attempted to inculcate within the U.N. a set of norms 
that would guide the Council’s exercise of discretion.5 The authors of the 
RtoP report noted that the Council “should deal promptly with any request 
2 See generally THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT 
AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 (Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
3 See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J.
INT’L L. 552 (1993) (offering a systematic analysis of Council legitimacy); Martin Binder & Monika 
Heupel, The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates, 59 
INT’L STUD. Q. 238 (2015); Ian Hurd, The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law, 7 
CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 361 (2014); Devon Whittle, The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security 
Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 671 (2015); 
SIMON CHESTERMAN, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE RULE OF LAW: FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN INITIATIVE 2004–2008 (2008), http://iilj.org/research/documents/ 
UNSC_and_the_Rule_of_Law.pdf. 
4 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 33 
(Feb. 5) (holding that basic rights of human persons are erga omnes).  For criticism of Council inaction in 
Rwanda, see Michael N. Barnett, The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda, 12 
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 551 (1997); Linda Melvern, The Security Council: Behind the Scenes, 77 
INT’L AFF. 101 (2001).
5 See generally INT’L COMM’N INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
(2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT] (arguing that RtoP is enshrined in two key principles: 1) State 
sovereignty implies responsibility, with the primary responsibility for the protection of a State’s people 
vesting with the State itself; and 2) the non-intervention principle that underpins sovereignty yields to the 
international responsibility to protect where a population is suffering serious harm due to State failure).
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for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large-scale loss of 
human life or ethnic cleansing.”6 Further, in light of this changing landscape 
there is growing state support for a code of conduct proposed by France,
which would require permanent members of the Council to voluntarily 
abstain from using a veto in cases “involving mass atrocity crimes.” 7
Although RtoP has gained some traction within the U.N., the failure of the 
Council to agree on a resolution to ease the humanitarian crisis in Syria has 
provoked widespread condemnation amongst states, prompting the U.N.
General Assembly (Assembly) to pass a strongly worded resolution, by a 
large majority, “deploring the failure of the Security Council.”8 In the field 
of international justice, the Council has also been criticised for condoning 
impunity given that it was deadlocked on both a referral to the ICC to 
investigate the Syrian situation and also on the creation of an ad hoc tribunal 
for the MH17 airline disaster.9
While some may contend that the Council’s 2012 deadlock over Syria 
stemmed from reasonable disagreement among the permanent members on 
the appropriate course of action, the prospect of the Council returning to the 
post-Cold War levels of cooperation that contributed to its functional 
expansion remains far from certain. Not all permanent members 
wholeheartedly share the view that the Council’s functions include the 
regulation of human rights situations within a state, reflecting a conception 
of security that prioritises national sovereignty over human rights. 10
Additionally, recent tensions among the permanent members over Russia’s 
intervention in Crimea have provoked references to a “new Cold War,” a 
view apparently most recently shared by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry 
6 Id. at 50.  
7 Meetings Coverage, Security Council, U.N. Speakers Call for Voluntary Suspension of Veto 
Rights in Cases of Mass Atrocity Crimes, as Security Council Debates Working Methods, U.N. Meetings 
Coverage SC/11164 (Oct. 29, 2013).  During this meeting, representatives for the following states spoke in 
support of France’s proposal:  Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives 
Mexico, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Ukraine.
8 G.A. Res. 66/253 B, (Aug. 3, 2012) (133 votes to 12, with 31 abstentions) (emphasis added). 
9 Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as 
Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Meetings Coverage 
SC/11407 (May 22, 2014); U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7498th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7498 (July 29, 2015).  See 
also Michael Ramsden, Uniting for MH17, ASIAN J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016).   
10 Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten, 29 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 161, 175–76
(2015).  Non-permanent member votes are important, but permanent members are primus inter pares, thus 
the most important focus for analysis on Council decision-making. David P. Forsythe, The U.N. Security 
Council and Response to Atrocities: The P-5 and International Criminal Law, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 840, 841 
(2012).
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Medvedev.11 Robert Legvold cautioned that these “new Cold War” tensions 
“will affect nearly every important dimension of the international system.”12
Given the likelihood of Council deadlock in the future on serious human 
rights abuses, it is necessary to evaluate the feasibility of invoking other 
collective security mechanisms to alleviate such crises. 
In this respect, there have been calls for the Assembly to make use of 
the Uniting for Peace (UfP) resolution. 13 This resolution contemplates 
Assembly action where, due to an absence of unanimity, the Council fails to 
maintain international peace and security in the view of the Assembly.14
The Assembly first invoked UfP to recommend the continuation of U.N.
action in Korea in 1950 following the Soviet Union’s veto of this mandate.
UfP has since been used to condemn acts of aggression and alien occupation, 
to support peacekeeping operations, and to augment claims of a people to 
self-determination, as with Palestine.15 In providing a basis for the Assembly 
to assume an enhanced role in regulating international security, it may 
therefore provide a solution in instances where the international community 
supports a “humanitarian intervention” that is otherwise stymied by a
Council Member’s veto. 
Still, uncertainties remain as to the continued relevance of UfP in a 
world that has moved on since the end of the Cold War. From the 
perspective of those who consider UfP obsolete in the modern era, the UfP
bore political relevance then precisely because it was a device for the 
permanent members (mainly the United States) to enjoy collective 
legitimacy for their actions when they were assured of support within the 
11 See James Stavridis, Are We Entering a New Cold War?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 17, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/are-we-entering-a-new-cold-war-russia-europe/. 
12 Robert Legvold, Managing the New Cold War, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 74, 75 (2014).
13 G.A. Res. 377 (V), (Nov. 3, 1950) (the Uniting for Peace (UfP) resolution).  There have been calls 
for the Assembly to invoke UfP in a variety of contexts, including the securing of accountability for mass 
crimes.  See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict, ¶ 1971, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 24, 2009); Independent Fact Finding Committee on 
Gaza to the League of Arab States, Report of the Independent Fact-Finding on Committee on Gaza:  No 
Safe Place, ¶ 610 (Apr. 30, 2009); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶¶ 362, 1201, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7, 2014); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/69 (Feb. 5, 
2015).  
14 G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 13.
15 See Christina Binder, Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶¶ 9–10 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2006); Keith S. Petersen, The Uses of the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution Since 1950, 13 INT’L ORG. 219 (1959).
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Assembly. Once the Assembly evolved to the point where it no longer 
generated majorities that favoured Western states, UfP was no longer used in 
the mainstream of U.N. practice.16 Changes in international politics and 
realignment of the balance of power would thus make UfP something of an 
unpredictable mechanism, a “double-edged sword” for states that sponsored 
such resolutions. 17 Furthermore, UfP is premised on the claim that 
“something should be done,” but there remains the belief that international 
security should not be overregulated, with the veto at least serving to ensure 
selective intervention in this respect.18
The Assembly of old was also differently composed than the one of 
today, with much larger states and, arguably, a stronger capacity and 
legitimacy to make decisions affecting international peace and security.19
The process of decolonisation and self-determination has produced many 
more states that in turn are able to vote in the Assembly, and to do so on an 
equal basis irrespective of the material differences between states.20 As it 
stands, China’s vote (representing a population of almost 1.3 billion) is 
given equal weight to Tuvalu’s (representing a population of about 11,000)
in the Assembly. Although the difference in material capabilities of states 
should have no bearing on the legitimacy of a state’s view on what 
constitutes a human rights abuse, it may be relevant to the enforcement of 
measures to address such abuse. The point here is that while the Council 
may suffer from a number of defects, at least it attributes greater weight to 
16 Andrew J. Carswell, Unblocking the Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution, 18 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 453, 455–56 (2013).
17 Id.
18 See ADAM ROBERTS & DOMINIK ZAUM, SELECTIVE SECURITY: WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE 1945 (2008).
19 The U.N. comprised 51 founding members in 1945; today it has 193 members, and all of them 
have a vote in the Assembly.  As to changes in voting in the Assembly, see Peter Ferdinand, Rising Powers 
at the UN: An Analysis of the Voting Behaviour of BRICS in the General Assembly, 35 THIRD WORLD Q.
376 (2014); Nicolas Burmester & Michael Jankowski, The Unsolved Puzzle: Pacific Asia’s Voting 
Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly—A Response to Peter Ferdinand, 16 BRIT. J. POL. &
INT’L REL. 680 (2014); Michal Onderco, “Tell Me What You Want”: Analyzing the Visegrád Countries’ 
Votes in the UN General Assembly, 28 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 63 (2014); DIANA PANKE, UNEQUAL 
ACTORS IN EQUALISING INSTITUTIONS: NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(2013).
20 See U.N. Charter, art. 18(1) (“Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.”).  As 
to size disparities in the Assembly and how this impacts on voting, see Diana Panke, Is Bigger Better? 
Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly, 30 NEGOT. J. 367 (2014). 
 
                                                        
272 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 2
 
the choices of bigger states who have the political and material capabilities
necessary to carry out the difficult role of managing international security.21
It is therefore undeniable that the Assembly also suffers from a 
number of shortcomings in terms of its ability to ensure that the U.N. adapts
to changing threats to international peace and security. Still, this article will 
focus on the more fundamental legal question of whether the Assembly may 
assume functions analogous to those of the Council in the event of deadlock. 
While the success of this legal proposition will ultimately turn on its 
application, which is inevitably a political choice, the following analysis 
provides a sufficiently clear legal basis for UfP to facilitate broad support, 
from large and small states alike, for the Assembly to assume an 
extraordinary function in those circumstances where the Council has failed 
to address serious human rights abuses. There are, admittedly, a number of 
obstacles. Unlike the Council’s impressive powers, the Assembly is limited 
to making “recommendations,” which, as the phrase suggests, carry no direct 
legal effect. 22 Many still question the legal significance of the UfP
resolution and its contemporary impact on U.N. practice. 23 More still 
challenge the notion that the Assembly’s resolutions are capable of binding 
or authorising the membership to do that which would otherwise contravene 
international law.24 Given recent condemnations of the use of vetoes and 
general uncertainty as to the continued application of UfP, a fresh analysis of 
these legal issues that goes to the heart of the U.N. Charter’s division of 
powers in maintaining international peace and security is warranted. 
This article will consider the extent to which an Assembly resolution 
could augment a “humanitarian intervention” pursuant to a U.N. mandate.
The focus on humanitarian intervention, involving the use of coercive force 
to forestall a humanitarian crisis, has attracted controversy precisely because 
it involves intervention without consent of the host State.25 UfP practice
21 DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE MAKING OF THE 
MODERN WORLD 19 (2009).
22 See U.N. Charter arts. 10–14.
23 Larry D. Johnson, “Uniting for Peace”: Does it Still Serve Any Useful Purpose?, AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND (July 15, 2014), http://www.asil.org/blogs/“uniting-peace”-does-it-still-serve-any-useful-
purpose.
24 Stefan Talmon, The Legalizing and Legitimizing Function of UN General Assembly Resolutions,
AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND (July 18, 2014), http://www.asil.org/blogs/legalizing-and-legitimizing-function-
un-general-assembly-resolutions.
25 Generally, “humanitarian intervention” is a concept used to describe the use of force outside of the 
U.N. Charter, although some also use the phrase to describe instances of U.N. action that serve a 
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regarding the deployment of forces, on the other hand, has generally 
concerned the recommendation to U.N. members to participate in
peacekeeping operations that have occurred at the host State’s invitation,
thus removing some of the controversies associated with Assembly
recommendations made under UfP. 26 Furthermore, the focus on 
humanitarian intervention here is prompted by the regular and periodic 
assertions by governments in favour of a right to intervene outside of the 
Charter framework in order to avert humanitarian crises.27 For example, 
large-scale human rights abuse in Syria provoked the British government to 
argue in 2013 that the failure of the Council to act would justify unilateral 
intervention based on a putative customary law exception to the use of 
force. 28 While there are serious doubts as to the basis for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention under custom, the question remains whether the 
Assembly may perform an authorising function for any such coercive 
intervention, such as to qualify it as enforcement action under the U.N.
Charter. 
Accordingly, this article will test the constitutional authority of the 
Assembly to authorise humanitarian intervention. Grounded in a 
teleological interpretation of the U.N. Charter and UfP practice, it will argue, 
provided the political will exists, that the Assembly may perform such a 
function. The Assembly is able to do this because the U.N. Charter permits 
a broad approach to implied powers and the imperfect observance of formal 
provisions where the assumption of power by this organ furthers the 
purposes of the U.N. This interpretation of the Charter is apparent not only 
from the reasoning of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but also from 
the practice and relations of the principal U.N. organs, particularly the 
Assembly and Council, since 1945. A historical survey of UfP practice also 
supports the Assembly’s authority to take enforcement action in 
extraordinary circumstances. 
humanitarian purpose.  See Carrie Booth Walling, Human Rights Norms, State Sovereignty, and 
Humanitarian Intervention, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 383 (2015). 
26 See Binder, supra note 15; infra Part II(A)(1) (describing the uses of UfP). 
27 For a survey of recent arguments, see generally FABIAN KLOSE, THE EMERGENCE OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2015); Juan Carlos de la Cuevas, Exceptional Measures Call for 
Exceptional Times: The Permissibility Under International Law of Humanitarian Intervention To Protect a 
People’s Right to Self-Determination, 37 HOUST. J. INT’L L. 491 (2015).  
28 Prime Minister’s Off., Policy Paper: Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government 
Legal Position (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-
syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-
position-html-version [hereinafter Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime]
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II. “UNITING FOR PEACE” AND “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION”
The necessary starting point for analysing the scope of the Assembly’s 
authority to authorise the use of force is Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 
which prohibits members from using force against another state.29 If the 
state in which a humanitarian crisis exists does not consent to outside 
intervention, then it is necessary to establish an exception to the use of force 
prohibition.30 While there is reasoned disagreement on the scope of Article 
2(4), consensus exists on two Charter-based exceptions. 31 First, under 
Article 51, states may act individually or collectively in self-defence if an 
“armed attack” occurs.  Second, the Council may take military enforcement 
action under Chapter VII upon finding that there is a “threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”32
A humanitarian crisis does not qualify as an “armed attack” directed 
against a state; this term is defined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
as requiring a cross-border incursion involving military force of a particular 
intensity.33 Humanitarian crises mostly occur within states rather than across 
borders; a mass exodus of refugees also does not constitute an armed attack,
given that it does not involve the use of armed force that can be attributed to 
29 For a thorough treatment on the scope of the use of force principle under Article 2(4), see THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller et al. eds., 2015).  See
also Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 285 (1973) (arguing that there are only limited circumstances in 
which force can be used under the U.N. Charter).
30 See Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 1 (2013) (analysing the consent principle and the extent to which it precludes international 
responsibility). 
31 Some have argued that the text of Article 2(4) itself only precludes the use of force that affects the 
“territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations Charter.”  On this permissive view, for instance, armed force that has the 
sole purpose to prevent human rights abuse, or to protect nationals abroad, or as reprisals for prior breaches 
of international law, would not violate Article 2(4).  However, this permissive view is inconsistent with the 
Charter’s travaux preparatoires, which indicated that the inclusion of this phrase was intended to 
strengthen the prohibition rather than to create exceptions to it.  Furthermore, reference to “territorial 
integrity or political independence” is more of a reference to the totality of statehood rather than limiting 
the prohibitive scope of Article 2(4).  Finally, the restrictive interpretation of Article 2(4) is reinforced in 
subsequent State practice, as reflected in the Assembly’s declaration in Resolution 2625.  G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) (“No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or 
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.”).  See also
STEPHEN HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 481–82 (2012).
32 U.N. Charter art. 39.
33 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27). 
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a State.34 Therefore, the use of force to avert a humanitarian crisis does not 
fall within the right to self-defence, and thus a Chapter VII authorisation is 
required. If the Council determines that human rights abuse within a state 
constitutes a “threat to the peace” and authorises enforcement action, then a 
“humanitarian intervention” is permitted. 35 The Council has used its 
Chapter VII powers for humanitarian purposes; the imposition of no-fly 
zones in Iraq in 1991 is a notable early example.36 Accordingly, a Council 
authorisation justifies what would otherwise be an unlawful use of force.37
However, actual or anticipated Council deadlock on grave 
humanitarian situations has led states to assert a legal basis for intervention 
outside the Charter framework.38 The humanitarian intervention doctrine 
was most recently asserted by Britain in response to the use of chemical 
weapons against civilian populations in Syria in 2013. The British Prime 
Minister argued that intervention would be lawful provided it was necessary, 
proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need, and supported by 
evidence of “extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale.”39 Even in the 
absence of Council authorisation, it “would still be permitted under 
international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale 
of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria.”40 The legality of 
this proposition turns on whether Article 2(4) is a comprehensive prohibition 
on the use of force.41 The length of this article precludes a detailed analysis 
34 Bruno Simma, NATO, The U.N. and the Use Of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 
(1999). In Nicaragua v. United States, in defining “armed attack,” the ICJ drew from the Definition of 
Aggression annexed to Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXII):  “[I]t may be considered to be agreed that an 
armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an 
international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to’
(inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement therein.’”  
Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., supra note 33, at ¶ 195 (quoting Article 3, paragraph (g) of the Definition of 
Aggression annexed to Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXII).
35 C.J. Apperley & Ian Brownlie, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law 
Aspects, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 878, 894, 904 (2000).
36 S.C. Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991).  
37 See generally DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY (1999).
38 See Nigel Rodley, Humanitarian Intervention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 775, 775–96 (Marc Weller ed., 2015) [hereinafter Rodley, Humanitarian 
Intervention] (providing an analysis of state practice). 
39 Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime, supra note 28. See also Johnson, supra note 23.
40 Id.
41 Carsten Stahn, Between Law-Breaking and Law-Making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and 
“What The Law Ought To Be,” 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 25, 33 (2013). 
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here of the competing positions, but strong arguments militate against 
humanitarian intervention outside of the Charter framework.
Specifically, there is little evidence showing that the humanitarian 
intervention doctrine has matured into custom, which requires state practice 
that is “extensive and virtually uniform” together with opinio juris.42 The 
few examples cited to show state acquiescence to the putative norm’s 
formation are equivocal and may easily be justified on alternative legal 
bases. For example, the interventions of India in East Pakistan (1971), 
Vietnam in Cambodia (1978), and Tanzania in Uganda (1979) each brought 
an end to serious human rights abuses, but the basis for the interventions was 
hotly contested and the intervening states prevaricated about their legal 
justifications.43 Similarly, the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 did 
not precipitate a change in custom.44 The acceptance of the responsibility to 
protect doctrine (RtoP) and international criminal law bolstered the case for 
unilateral humanitarian intervention as a customary norm.45
It is true that RtoP derives from the same normative root as the 
humanitarian intervention doctrine: both are concerned with protecting 
civilian populations from serious human rights abuses. But RtoP supports 
U.N. collective security rather than challenging it. The Assembly’s 2005 
adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document affirms RtoP action 
through the Council: it recognises that the international community is
“prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through 
the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, 
on a case-by-case basis . . . [where] national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.” 46 Similarly, the emergence of 
international criminal law only supports the case for post-conflict 
accountability. It is possible to conceive of accountability for atrocities as a 
42 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G) v. Den.; F.R.G v. 
Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20).
43 See generally Franck & Rodley, supra note 29. 
44 Apperley & Brownlie, supra note 35, at 904.
45 Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment—The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of 
Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL TALK! BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 12 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention.
46 G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139 (Sept. 16, 2005) (emphasis added).  The same paragraph also notes rather 
generally the Assembly’s role under RtoP: “We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international 
law.” Id.
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multi-staged process, including humanitarian intervention and international 
criminal law, but the two have developed along quite different legal paths. 
While international criminal law has advanced with the support of 
multilateral treaties (e.g., the Rome Statute) and Chapter VII powers
(notably, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), the 
humanitarian intervention doctrine is lacking in “extensive and virtually 
uniform” acceptance of its customary status.47
The principal concern about the doctrine is that it will be abused; that 
risk might be alleviated were the Assembly, acting under the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution (UfP), to assume an authorising function.48 The character 
of the Assembly as a multilateral forum could assuage concerns that 
humanitarian intervention is premised on the unilateral assessment of self-
interested states. While these concerns will always persist regardless of 
forum, there is at least the prospect that a humanitarian intervention 
authorised by the U.N.’s general membership in a consensual process would 
confer legality and legitimacy on the operation. Indeed, it is indicative that 
Britain and the United States chose to pursue action in Kosovo through 
NATO instead of invoking UfP, perhaps because of the political risk that the 
resolution might fail. 49 Those States perhaps chose to maintain the 
intervention’s putative legitimacy, despite its questionable legality. Still, in 
the event of a veto being exercised in the Council, the Assembly provides a 
suitable alternative multilateral forum in which to authorise humanitarian 
intervention, provided the political will exists.
The use of UfP as a basis for humanitarian intervention lacks precedent but 
is not without supporters. During the conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s,
Canada considered using UfP to gain authorisation for the NATO action.50
At that time, scholars recognised the validity of the 1950 resolution as a 
basis for the Assembly to act where a Council resolution was blocked and 
47 See F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth., 1969 I.C.J., supra note 42, at ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) (explaining the 
classic formulation for establishing custom).
48 See Group of 77 Summit in Havana, Cuba: Declaration of the South Summit, ¶ 54 (Apr. 10–14, 
2000), http://www.g77.org/Docs/Declaration_G77Summit.htm (containing criticisms composed by the 
Group of 77, a coalition of southern nations).  See also Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perspectives on 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 99 (2004). 
49 Nigel White, Relationship Between the Security Council and General Assembly, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293, 306 (Marc Weller et al. eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter White, Relationship Between].
50 Paul Heinbecker, Kosovo, in THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST 
CENTURY 537, 543 (David Malone ed., 2004).
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suggested that humanitarian intervention could be appropriate under UfP.51
The major issue, however, is whether the Assembly is able to assume the
Council’s function in authorising forcible coercive measures. During the 
Kosovo crisis some British officials appeared to doubt the use of UfP to 
effectuate a humanitarian intervention, partly because an Assembly 
resolution cannot equate to a Chapter VII authorisation.52 It is therefore 
critical to determine whether the Assembly possesses the constitutional 
power to authorise such coercive action. 
A. Coercive Measures and the Uniting for Peace Resolution 
In the text of the U.N. Charter, only the Council is empowered to take 
forcible coercive measures. 53 By contrast, the Assembly’s function is 
essentially deliberative—it may “discuss,” “promote,” and “recommend.”54
Unlike Council decisions, an Assembly recommendation does not bind the 
membership, unless pertaining to internal operational matters, such as 
admission of U.N. members or budget apportionment.55 Given the hortatory 
nature of the Assembly’s express powers, in stark contrast to the coercive 
powers attributed to the Council, it must be analysed how the Assembly is
able to authorise a humanitarian intervention. A starting point for this 
analysis is the relevant text from the UfP resolution, which was passed 
following growing frustration over Council inaction, most notably with 
respect to the deadlock on the continuation of the U.N. mandate in Korea in 
1950. The UfP resolution provides in its relevant part:
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of 
unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a 
51 See Apperley & Brownlie, supra note 35, at 904 (“The argument that a resolution would have 
been ‘blocked’ by Russia and/or China is unattractive, in part because the matter could then have been 
taken to the U.N. General Assembly (in a Special Emergency Session) on the basis of the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution of 1950. Presumably the NATO States had no hope of obtaining a two-thirds majority in the 
General Assembly.”). 
52 See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFF. COMM., MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1999, HC 28-II, ¶ 
63–64 (UK), http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/ 9111 
818.htm (Statement by Mr. Emyr Jones Parry); HOUSE OF COMMONS, FOURTH REPORT OF THE SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 2000, HC 28-II, ¶ 128 (UK), http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm 199900/cmselect /cmfaff/28/2813.htm#a35.
53 U.N. Charter art. 42. 
54 Id. arts. 11–17, 55. 
55 South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J.
Rep. 6, 50–51 (July 18).
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threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the 
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a 
view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for 
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the 
peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when 
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.56
During the discussion of the UfP resolution, Assembly members advanced 
many arguments for and against the resolution, including its precise scope.
Opposing interpretations of the U.N. Charter were used to prove the 
assertions of each side.57 From this, and subsequent practice, there are two 
competing theories on the resolution’s scope. The first is that the 
“recommendations to members for collective measures” only reflects the 
Assembly’s deliberative functions; such a recommendation has no legal 
significance and members have no duty to follow it. The recommendation 
would not make lawful what is otherwise an unlawful use of force. For 
brevity, this theory is labelled “weak UfP.” By contrast, “strong UfP”
theory asserts that the Assembly may recommend that members take 
enforcement action. While such a recommendation is not binding on the 
membership, it serves to authorise states to use force in accordance with a 
U.N. mandate. In the following parts of this article, the basic features of 
these two theories will be outlined. This article will then advance the claim 
that the U.N.’s constitutional structure is such that the Assembly can assume 
enforcement powers to authorise a humanitarian intervention under a U.N.
mandate.
1. “Weak UfP”
According to weak UfP, the Assembly cannot authorise force because 
the resolution only recognises the ability of the Assembly to act concurrently 
with the Council to discuss and make non-binding recommendations to U.N.
members. This assertion of power was made despite Article 12(1), which 
forbids the Assembly from making recommendations with respect to a 
dispute or situation where the Council is still exercising its functions. In its 
Advisory Opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory the ICJ observed that decades of practice 
56 G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 13 (emphasis added).  
57 See J. Andrassy, Uniting for Peace, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (1956).
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have modified Article 12(1) to permit the Assembly to act concurrently with 
the Council, even where the Council was deliberating on a situation 
implicating international peace and security.58 However, the constitutional 
significance of UfP should not be overstated. That the Assembly may 
recommend the use of armed force should be interpreted within the Charter 
framework and general international law. 59 In particular, Article 2(4) 
prohibits U.N. members from using force, subject to the exceptions of self-
defence and Chapter VII authorisations. An Assembly recommendation is 
not acknowledged as a possible exception to Article 2(4), which undermines 
any supposed permissive effect of an Assembly recommendation to use 
force. 
The ability to take coercive action is exclusively vested in the 
Council.60 Pursuant to Article 11, if the Assembly forms a view on the need 
to use force, it should convey a recommendation to the Council for 
“enforcement action.”61 The text of UfP confirms the Assembly’s limited 
role, in that it suggests that the Assembly may only make a recommendation 
in the case of a “breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”62 In the context 
of weak UfP, the terms “breach of the peace” or “act of aggression” are 
equated to an armed attack by one state against another.63 An Assembly 
recommendation to use force is thus a simple declaration of the right to self-
defence.64
UfP practice also provides some support for the Assembly’s limited 
role. The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion Certain Expenses of the United Nations
distinguished an Assembly-mandated peacekeeping operation (premised on 
host state’s consent) from an “enforcement action” under Chapter VII, the 
58 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 27 (July 9).  The ICJ’s finding on Article 12(1) was primarily based on the 
conclusion that the Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion was not a “recommendation.”  Id. ¶¶ 49, 
51–54.
59 See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4: 
Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure, 34 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1958).
60 See G.A. Res. 60/286, ¶ 1 (Oct. 9, 2006) (acknowledging the Council’s primary responsibility for
peace and security).
61 U.N. Charter art. 11.
62 G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 13.
63 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE § 906 (5th ed. 2011).
64 See Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International 
Law 3 (2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf.  See also Dominik Zaum, The Security Council, 
the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 2, at 154, 171.
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latter being the Council’s exclusive preserve. 65 Furthermore, that the 
Assembly acting under UfP asked the Council to take action in a number of 
situations underlines the Council’s exclusive role in authorising coercive 
measures by states.66
Practice according to weak UfP is interpreted as reinforcing the jus ad 
bellum justifications of self-defence or host state consent and not coercive 
action. Identifying practice is ambiguous given that relevant subsequent 
resolutions do not always cite the UfP resolution, but some conclusions may 
be drawn nonetheless. 67 The Assembly’s reaction to the Council’s 
withdrawal of support for the Republic of Korea during the 1950s is an 
example where UfP may have provided justification for Assembly action 
even though it was not cited. The 1950 U.N. Council Resolution on Korea
concerned an attack by forces from North Korea on the Republic of 
Korea. The Council characterised this as an armed attack and “breach of the 
peace,” recommending “that Members of the United Nations furnish such 
assistance to the Republic of Korea.”68 Following a Soviet veto on the 
continuation of the U.N. mission, the Assembly passed Resolution 498(V), 
which called on states to “lend every assistance to the United Nations action 
in Korea.” 69 Here, “every assistance” suggests a continuation of the 
Council’s recommendation to assist South Korea to repel an armed attack.70
The same justification underpins the Assembly’s condemnation in
Resolution ES-8/1, which noted South Africa’s “unprovoked massive armed 
aggression against Angola,” calling on the “international community to 
provide ‘military assistance’ to ‘front line States in order to defend their 
sovereignty’. . . against renewed acts of aggression by South Africa.”71
Resolutions under UfP have also been based on host state consent. 
The power of the Peace Observation Commission, established to report on
situations where tension exists, is dependent on the consent of the state into 
whose territory it enters. 72 Similarly, the Assembly created various 
65 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151 (July 20).  
66 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 8/2, ¶ 12 (Sept. 14, 1981) (illustrating the Assembly asked the Council to 
impose sanctions on South Africa for its continued occupation of Namibia).
67 Binder, supra note 15, § 9.
68 S.C. Res. 83 (June 27, 1950).
69 G.A. Res. 498 (V), ¶ 4 (Feb. 1, 1951). 
70 Johnson, supra note 23.
71 G.A. Res. 8/2, supra note 66, at ¶ 7.
72 U.N. Secretary-General, Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and 
Operation of the Force, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/3943 (Oct. 9, 1958). 
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peacekeeping missions with a consensual foundation, for instance
recommending members to “assist” the Congo in upholding “law and 
order.”73 The consensual foundation of the UfP is what ensured its broad 
support within the Assembly during the Cold War. Thus, it was only 
because Egypt consented to the deployment of the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) on its territory that the Soviet Union abstained in 
the Assembly rather than opposing the force’s establishment.74
2. “Strong UfP”
According to strong UfP theory, the purposes underpinning the U.N.
Charter enable the Assembly to authorise coercive measures where the 
Council has failed to discharge its primary responsibility to the collective 
security community. Pursuant to Article 1(1), a key purpose of the U.N
Charter is to maintain international peace and security through “collective 
measures.”75 Article 1(1) does not specify which entity is to engage in 
collective measures—peace and security are underpinnings of the U.N.
Charter writ large and not just the functions of the Council.76 Under Article 
24, “Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security.”77 The term “primary responsibility”
implies that secondary responsibility falls on the Assembly, given that it is 
the only organ within the U.N. that represents all members (and thus is the 
collective that conditionally confers power on the Council). As the ICJ in 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Certain Expenses) observed, the 
U.N. Charter makes it “abundantly clear” that the Assembly is also 
concerned with international peace and security.78 That the Assembly may 
recommend “measures” under Article 14 for the peaceful adjustment of any 
situation itself “implies some kind of action.”79 The overarching purpose of 
73 G.A. Res. 1474 (ES-IV), ¶ 2 (Sept. 17–19, 1960).
74 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946–1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY
262 (1969).
75 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶1.
76 See, e.g., G.A. Res. ES-7/7 (Aug. 19, 1982) (explaining the General Assembly is “[d]eeply aware 
of the responsibility of the United Nations under its Charter for the maintenance of international peace”) 
(emphasis added). 
77 U.N Charter, art. 24, ¶ 1.
78 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151 (July 20).
79 Id.
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the U.N. thus provides the Assembly with the power to recommend 
enforcement measures where the Council is deadlocked.80
Still, Article 11(2) directs the Assembly to refer any question where 
“action” is necessary to the Council. Certain Expenses may be interpreted 
under weak UfP theory as showing that only the Council may authorise 
coercive action. However, in that case the ICJ was referring to the Council 
having a monopoly on mandatory coercive action, defined as being a 
decision binding on the U.N. membership, for instance to contribute 
forces.81 The ICJ stated that the Council may “order coercive action.”82 By 
contrast, where the Assembly recommends action, it does not bind U.N.
members. 83 Accordingly, the voluntary peacekeeping force in Certain 
Expenses did not constitute Council “action.”84 Crucially, then, the ICJ 
opinion envisages members contributing voluntarily to U.N. “action”
occurring outside of a Chapter VII mandate. Furthermore, this reading is 
consistent with the view, as expressed by Judge Lauterpacht, that Assembly 
recommendations may “on proper occasions” provide a “legal authorisation”
for members to act on them.85 While Judge Lauterpacht did not elaborate 
further on this statement, the authorising function of Assembly resolutions is 
bound to be context-specific, based on the acceptance of strong UfP and the 
Council’s failure to maintain international security.
The scope of the use of force prohibition in the U.N. Charter is also 
instructive. The Assembly is not subject to this prohibition, which binds “all 
Members” by contrast to the “Organization.” 86 Article 2 distinguishes 
between Organization and Members, with subparagraph (4) only referring to 
80 See Nigel D. White, From Korea to Kuwait: The Legal Basis of United Nations’ Military Action,
20 THE INT’L HIST. REV. 597, 603 (1998) [hereinafter White, From Korea to Kuwait] (explaining that it
was contemplated the Council members would act, to use President Roosevelt’s phrase, as “trustees” for 
the international community.  Although this is not used as a legal term of art, the point was that Council 
decision-making was supposed to serve the international community rather than the national interests of 
Council members).
81 NIGEL WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 78 (2d ed. 2005).
82 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
83 Kay Hailbronner & Eckart Klein, Functions & Powers: Article 10, in THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 226, 237–38 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1995). 
84 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
85 Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of 
South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 115 (June 7) (separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.).
86 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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“Members” when stating the prohibition.87 Therefore, the salient issue is 
whether acts of members pursuant to an Assembly resolution may be 
attributed to the U.N. so as to fall outside of Article 2(4). It is well 
recognised that U.N. organs may delegate their power to subsidiary bodies.88
Indeed, in Certain Expenses the ICJ did not question the constitutional 
foundation of peacekeeping operations in the Congo and Suez, even though 
their powers were directly or tacitly supported by Assembly resolutions.89
Furthermore, the Collective Measures Committee, a subsidiary organ 
established under UfP, noted that “in the event of a decision or 
recommendation of the United Nations to undertake collective measures . . . 
States should not be subjected to legal liabilities under treaties or other 
international agreements as a consequence of carrying out United Nations 
collective measures.”90 As a subsidiary organ tasked with giving effect to 
UfP, this statement is strong evidence as to the legal nature of 
recommendations under this mechanism, placing Assembly-mandated 
military action within the Charter framework and thus not subject to Article 
2(4). 
Still, it is necessary to establish that a delegation of authority is valid.
The delegator must not exceed its own authority, and must expressly and 
specifically prescribe the power being delegated, retain “overall authority 
and control,” and have the ability to rescind the delegated power.91 The 
most pertinent requirement here is that the delegation must not exceed the 
delegator’s own authority. Given the admittedly deliberative functions of 
the Assembly, such a delegation to use force is based on teleological 
reasoning. The constitutional justification for a teleological construction of 
the U.N. Charter is explored in Part II(B) below, but it suffices to note that 
this interpretive basis for delegated powers is not unprecedented. As the ICJ 
noted in Certain Expenses, the Council may decide to take enforcement 
action even though a necessary requirement for such decision, Article 43 
agreements, did not come into effect.92 The dilemma faced by the Council, 
therefore, was that it would have been unable to give effect to its resolutions 
given the unavailability of a standing U.N. force. The solution was to treat 
87 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”) (emphasis added).
88 See D.W. BOWETT ET AL., UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY 299–301 (2008).
89 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
90 U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. 13, 33, U.N. Doc. A/1891 (1951).  See also Talmon, supra note 24.
91 SAROOSHI, supra note 37, at 34.
92 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
 
                                                        
APRIL 2016 “UNITING FOR PEACE” AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 285
 
Council resolutions as an authorisation for states to intervene under a U.N 
mandate pursuant to the resolution. There is now no disputing the Council’s 
ability to delegate enforcement action despite lacking textual support in the 
U.N. Charter; this authorisation mechanism has been used to legally support 
intervention in a number of situations in places such as Kuwait, Haiti, East 
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, to name a few.93 Furthermore, that there 
exists a distinction between a Council “decision” and an Assembly 
“recommendation” does not alter the conclusion that the Assembly is able to 
delegate authority.94 In the absence of Article 43 agreements, to establish a 
standing U.N. force, the Council may only recommend that U.N. members 
contribute toward a Chapter VII operation.95 Whether the delegation takes 
place in a non-binding recommendation or by decision is of no legal 
consequence—such recommendations are sufficient to delegate Chapter VII 
authority to willing states.96
B. Constructing the Assembly’s Powers Under the U.N. Charter 
Whether the Assembly is ultimately able to recommend coercive 
measures will depend on resolving the conflict between the doctrines of 
attributed and implied powers. Whereas weak UfP has textual support in the 
U.N. Charter, strong UfP relies more broadly on the teleological argument 
that the U.N. should effectively ensure and maintain international peace and 
security. 
1. Teleological Interpretation and Implied Powers in the U.N. Charter
The attributed powers doctrine prescribes that an organ may only 
perform actions authorised by U.N. members. 97 Powers not expressly 
conferred are the result of intentional omissions, which must be respected.98
By contrast, the implied powers doctrine, underpinned by teleological 
interpretation, permits an organ to assume powers that are essential to, or in 
93 Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council 
to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 541, 543 (2000).
94 See Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 879, 880 (2005) (discussing the 
differences between decisions and recommendations).
95 SAROOSHI, supra note 37, at 149; DINSTEIN, supra note 63, § 887. 
96 SAROOSHI, supra note 37, at 149; DINSTEIN, supra note 63, § 887. 
97 For an analysis on the differences between attributed and implied powers doctrines, see Viljam 
Engstrom, Reasoning on Powers of Organizations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 56–83 (Jan Klabbers & Åsa Wallendahl eds., 2011). 
98 JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW 63 (2015).
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furtherance of, the organisation’s functioning. 99 These implied powers 
might arise (narrowly) from the stated provisions or (broadly) from the
general purposes of the organisation and the needs of the international 
community.100
Methods of treaty interpretation are therefore central to determining 
the scope of the Assembly’s powers. The U.N. Charter does not set out 
specific rules on interpretation, making analysis of general principles 
necessary. Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) instructs that a treaty should be interpreted in accordance “with the 
ordinary meaning . . . and in light of its object and purpose.” 101 This 
provision reflects a compromise of sorts between a textual and teleological 
approach, although the primacy given to the text may limit the scope of a 
teleological interpretation where it undermines the ordinary meaning of a 
word.102 The VCLT provides a useful framework for “ordinary” treaties, but 
as Sands and Klein noted, treaties establishing international organisations 
warrant special treatment. 103 This is so with the U.N. Charter, a treaty 
possessing a constitutional character: a universal and comprehensive 
mandate, representing the international community and containing certain 
hierarchical elements.104 The U.N. Charter should therefore be subject to 
different rules of interpretation having regard to the “intrinsically 
evolutionary nature of a constitution.”105
The adoption of a teleological approach adheres to interpretive norms 
and is established in ICJ jurisprudence as central to the U.N.’s dynamic 
constitutional order. In Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the Nations Advisory Opinion (Reparations), the ICJ found that “[u]nder 
international law, the Organisation must be deemed to have those powers 
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it 
99 Dapo Akande, The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of 
the ICJ, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437, 445 (1998).  
100 Id.
101 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 33, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
102 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/191, at 218 (1966) (noting the tension in Article 33, but observing that the majority of jurists 
preferred a primacy of the text approach).
103 PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 454 (6th ed. 
2009).
104 Sabine von Schorlemer, The United Nations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 466, 474 (Jan Klabbers & Åsa Wallendahl eds., 2011).
105 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1268 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151 (July 20).  
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by necessary implication, as being essential to the performance of its 
duties.”106 From the ICJ’s point of view, the U.N. should be effective in 
achieving its objectives. The ICJ’s position is further underpinned in Effect 
of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, where the court found that the Assembly was competent to 
establish an employment tribunal despite lacking the express powers to do 
so.107 The doctrine of implied powers was broadly articulated in Certain 
Expenses, where the ICJ stated that “when the Organization takes action 
which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one 
of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such 
action is not ultra vires the Organization.”108 The ICJ disavowed a literal 
interpretation of the U.N. Charter where doing so left the U.N. “impotent in 
the face of an emergency situation.” 109 What is remarkable here is the 
distinction drawn between purposes and powers: an asserted power that is 
rationally connected to a purpose of the U.N. will be lawful. The creation of 
a peacekeeping force, furthering international security, even without any 
textual support in the U.N. Charter, was thus intra vires.110
However, a more recent ICJ advisory opinion concerning the 
competencies of the World Health Organization (WHO) suggests a departure 
from these earlier functionalist interpretations. In Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the ICJ noted that international 
organisations do not possess a general competence, but are governed by the 
“‘principle of specialty,’ that is to say, they are invested by the States which 
create them with the powers, the limits of which are a function of the 
common interests of promotion those States entrust to them.” 111 The 
principle of specialty is synonymous with the attribution principle. 112
Accordingly, the WHO lacked the competence to consider the legality of 
nuclear weapons, as this question was “immaterial” to the WHO’s 
106 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 
174, 182 (Apr. 11).
107 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 57 (July 13).
108 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65. 
109 Id. at 61. 
110 See also Nigel White, The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues, in THE 
UN, PEACE AND FORCE, 42, 46 (Michael Pugh ed., 1996).
111 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request by the World 
Health Organization), Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 66, 78 (July 8).  
112 HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY 
WITHIN DIVERSITY 158 (rev. 5th ed. 2011).
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functioning. 113 This reflects Judge Hackworth’s dissent in Reparations,
which states that “powers not expressed cannot freely be implied [but must]
flow from a grant of express powers.”114
Although a narrow approach may be applied to specialised agencies 
like the WHO, this approach is not applicable to the U.N.’s principal 
organs.115 The reasoning in Certain Expenses shows a liberal approach with 
respect to powers that are used to further peace and security, over which the 
Assembly has broad competence under Articles 11 and 12 of the U.N.
Charter. 116 Indeed, the broad competencies and membership of the 
Assembly are incomparable to that of a specialised agency such as the 
WHO. 117 Therefore, it is apparent that the preponderance of judicial 
authority favours a broad approach to the implied powers of principal 
organs, where doing so furthers a purpose of the U.N.
This broad approach is not only borne out in the courtroom, but also 
in the practice of other U.N. organs.  Realisation of the U.N. Charter’s 
purposes has required the redistribution of powers between the U.N.’s 
principal organs and thus the imperfect observance of the formal power 
divisions in the Charter.118 This reflects the accepted position that the U.N.
Charter is a “living” instrument, providing justification for procedural 
latitude in giving effect to subsequent practice.119 Accordingly, U.N. organs 
have assumed an increasingly broad array of powers to address new 
international security challenges. 120 This has led the Council to assume
functions of the Assembly, and as evident from UfP, vice-versa. The 
phenomena of “legislative” resolutions provides a good example of how the
Council has assumed a standard-setting function (traditionally the 
Assembly’s function), thereby bypassing the slower processes of customary 
113 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J., supra note 111,
at 76.  
114 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 
174, 198 (Apr. 11). 
115 White, Relationship Between, supra note 49, at 295. 
116 U.N. Charter arts. 11–12.
117 Id.
118 Ruth Wedgewood, Unilateral Action in the UN System, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 349, 349 (2000).
119 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the Nations, 1949 I.C.J., supra note 106, at 
182.
120 von Schorlemer, supra note 104, at 467–70.
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law formation to imbue broadly worded resolutions with the force to bind 
the entire U.N. membership.121
Such changes are possible because of the essentially “decentralized”
nature of the U.N.122 Questions as to permissible constitutional limits are 
most acute in legal systems where a supreme, impartial organ is able to 
render an authoritative decision on the division of powers within an
international organisation. The U.N., on the other hand, is comprised of 
organs that are co-equals, with none formally possessing the power of 
authoritative interpretation.123 Further, the Council does not possess the 
legal authority to control acts of the Assembly.124 The Council may seek to 
pass a resolution objecting to any assertion of legal power made by the 
Assembly, but the prospect of this passing turns on it having the support of 
all permanent members. However, the political reality remains that the 
Assembly is only ever likely to recommend enforcement action under UfP
with the support of at least one permanent member, which is borne out in 
practice.125
Within such a decentralised order, as the ICJ noted, each organ must 
“in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.”126 This suggests a 
residual, although limited, role for judicial review.  The ICJ cannot subject 
an Assembly resolution to the same form of review as found in domestic 
constitutional systems, as it does not possess the power to generally 
invalidate a decision according to a hierarchy of norms. 127 The ICJ’s 
advisory jurisdiction has no binding force, and decisions taken in 
contentious cases would only produce legal effects for parties in those 
121 See generally Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175
(2005).
122 von Schorlemer, supra note 104, at 467.
123 Commission IV Judicial Organization, Summary Rep. of Fourteenth Meeting of Committee IV/2, 
U.N. Doc. 843 IV/2/37 (June 7, 1945), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945, 645, 645–46 (1998); Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151, 168 (July 20).
124 The reverse, on the other hand, is true:  the Assembly has power under Article 17 of the U.N. 
Charter to control the budget and thus consider the validity of Council resolutions, at least insofar as 
determining the validity of expenditures.  U.N. Charter art. 17, ¶ 1.
125 Tomuschat, supra note 64, at 4. 
126 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65.
127 ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST 
WRONGFUL SANCTIONS 59 (2011).
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proceedings.128 This is not to deny the wider (de)legitimising force of an 
ICJ decision; if it were to hold an Assembly resolution to be ultra vires,
states may voluntarily desist from relying on the resolution as a legal basis 
for action.129 But the perceived validity of an Assembly resolution would 
also be dictated by other factors which cannot be readily discounted, 
including the conviction of the large number of members within the 
Assembly who impliedly asserted the legal position that a resolution is intra 
vires to the organ’s powers. 
Even so, as noted above, it is very unlikely that the ICJ would cast 
doubt on the legality of an Assembly resolution given the broad approach it 
has taken to implied powers. Such unlikelihood is further reinforced by the 
deferential standard of review adopted by the ICJ. A resolution would have 
to be “manifestly ultra vires” to be invalidated by the ICJ. 130 As Judge 
Fitzmaurice noted when reviewing the validity of UfP expenditure, “only if 
the invalidity of the expenditure was apparent on the face of the matter, or 
too manifest to be open to reasonable doubt, would such a prima facie
presumption [of validity] not arise.”131 A resolution that violated the jus 
cogens is indicative of a fundamental defect. 132 A resolution supporting 
strong UfP, duly certified by the Assembly as falling within the purposes of 
the U.N., would not sustain a finding of manifest ultra vires by the ICJ.
2. U.N. Practice and Interpretation 
The purpose of this analysis has been to lay the foundation for the 
argument that the Assembly’s passage of the UfP resolution reflected an 
accepted interpretation by the membership as to the scope of this organ’s 
powers under the U.N. Charter. Furthermore, any future resolution 
128 See Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for 
Judicial Control of the Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46(2) INT’L COMP. L.Q. 309, 334 (1997) 
(stating that only one third of members have accepted the optional clause of Article 36(2)).
129 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 26 (1990). 
130 See Ebere Osieke, The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 249 (1983); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65
(Morelli J., concurring).
131 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J., supra note 65, at 204–05 (July 20).  Also see 
the “fundamental defect” standard noted in WHO advisory opinion. Legality of the Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request by the World Health Organization), Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 66, 82 (July 8).
132 See Thomas Franck, The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN 
Legality? 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 519, 521–22 (1992).
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recommending coercive measures would have an authorising effect. In 
making this argument, it is necessary to address two major concerns. 
First, it may be argued that members’ intent as to the permissibility of 
strong UfP cannot readily be discerned from the existing body of 
resolutions. Powers under the U.N. Charter may develop, but as the VCLT 
provides, this must come with “subsequent practice.”133 The ICJ, in its 1971 
Advisory Opinion regarding South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia,
advised that this practice must be “established.”134 On this view, if the 
Assembly recommended coercive measures in the future, it would lack the 
legal basis to do so unless and until such measures become customary. The 
assumption underpinning this argument is that if a power cannot be 
discerned from the text, it is necessary to establish that it has emerged as a 
“customary power” after a long gestation period.135
Yet, the suggestion that there is no practice supporting strong UfP is 
misconceived. Although the Council’s 1950 resolution on Korea appeared 
to endorse collective self-defence, it was passed amidst debate as to the legal 
viability of Council “authorisations” in the absence of Article 43 special 
agreements to establish a standing force.136 This demonstrates that Council 
members regarded Resolution 83, in response to the North Korean attack on 
South Korea, as authorising U.N. enforcement action; otherwise, any 
discussion on the resolution’s authorising effect would clearly be 
superfluous.137 Moreover, it is intriguing to note that once the Soviet Union 
resumed its seat on the Council and vetoed the continuation of enforcement 
action, the Assembly resolution that supported continuation went even 
further than the Council’s seemingly more limited mandate. Assembly 
Resolution 376 sought to achieve “a unified, independent and democratic 
government of Korea,” including the crossing of the 38th parallel, an 
objective that clearly goes beyond the stricter confines of self-defence 
133 U.N. Charter art. 31, ¶ 3(b). 
134 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 22 (1970).
135 This reflects a distinction sometimes drawn in the literature (not one that the ICJ recognises) 
between “implied” and “customary” powers, the former being powers conferred at the time of the 
organisation’s creation, the latter postdating the constitutional instrument and arising from practice.  See
SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 112, at 181–82.  
136 S.C. Res. 83, supra note 68; S.C. Res. 84 (July 7, 1950); S.C. Res. 85 (July 31, 1950).
137 White, From Korea to Kuwait, supra note 80, at 613. 
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principles. 138 There was a general recognition amongst states and other 
actors that Korea was a U.N. operation, not self-defence.139
Even beyond Korea, there is some support for Assembly-
recommended enforcement action in the context of peacekeeping operations.
While the essential premise of such operations is host state consent, there 
have been episodes where the consenting government has disintegrated, thus 
engaging peacekeeping troops in broader enforcement measures against 
secessionist fighters and mercenaries. This argument provides some 
explanation for the mandate of the U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 
which given the lack of government stability was based more broadly on 
maintaining Congo’s territorial integrity against secessionist fighters and 
facilitating a process in which a new government could be elected.140 The 
Assembly’s endorsement of this mandate, albeit temporary, provides tacit 
support for this organ’s capacity to recommend voluntary enforcement 
action.141 Although there is only limited practice of strong UfP, this does 
not negate its probative value, given that U.N. enforcement action is itself a 
rare occurrence. What is important from these examples is the absence of 
any significant dissent to the Assembly authorising enforcement action, 
which provides the strongest evidence of the constitutionality of these 
measures.142
Additionally, the notion that there must always be an established 
practice for an organ to exercise implied powers is open to debate. The 
requirement of “established practice” exists in order to distil a general 
consensus amongst the membership that the treaty in question necessarily 
includes the powers that are asserted. This is readily apparent from Article 
31 of the VCLT, which refers to “any subsequent practice . . . which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” 143
Finally, it falls upon the members themselves to interpret the scope of an
organ’s powers under the U.N. Charter.144 This is based on the principle that 
138 G.A. Res. 376 (Oct. 7, 1950); White, Relationship Between, supra note 49, at 311.
139 White, From Korea to Kuwait, supra note 80, at 614.
140 N.D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE 254–61 (2nd ed. 1997). 
141 The Council transferred the mandate of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the 
Assembly.  See S.C. Res. 157 (Sept. 4, 1960).
142 G.A. Res. 376, supra note 138 (passed with 47 in favour, 5 against and 7 abstentions); G.A. Res. 
1474, supra note 73 (relating to the Congo and was adopted without a dissenting vote). 
143 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31., May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered 
into force Jan. 27, 1980) (emphasis added). 
144 Oscar Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations, in 109 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1963), 
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an interpretation of the treaty is as binding on the parties as the treaty 
itself.145 During the drafting of the U.N. Charter, the point was made that if 
an interpretation of the treaty “is not generally acceptable it will be without 
binding force,” thus recognising that interpretations receiving general 
approval will be authoritative.146 Furthermore, in Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ 
confirmed that the Assembly had the competency to interpret its own powers 
under Article 12 of the U.N. Charter.147 Therefore, while a debate may 
ensue about the scope of the Assembly’s powers and the proper legal 
method for determining it, ultimately the organisation derives the source of 
its authority from the membership.  The scope of powers is to be determined 
by the members themselves. 
Admittedly, this will often require a long gestation period to evince an 
accepted interpretation, especially if there is interpretive disagreement 
amongst members. It may also take a long time because the general 
membership is unable to directly manifest its will over the organ interpreting 
particular powers under the U.N. Charter. For example, the Council has 
adopted a practice of interpreting Article 27 “concurring” votes to not 
include abstentions.148 In the Namibia Advisory Opinions, the ICJ noted 
that this had become established practice within the Council, but what is 
significant is the court’s observation that this practice “has been generally 
accepted by Members of the United Nations.” 149 The ICJ thus
acknowledged the sovereignty of U.N. members to control interpretation of 
the Charter. That a practice needed to develop to evince the members’ intent 




145 HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL 
PROBLEMS xiii (4th ed. 1964).
146 U.N. Conf. Int’l Orgs., Rep. of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2, U.N. Doc. 933 IV/2/42(2) ¶ 7 
(June 12, 1945), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 123, at 703; Schachter, supra note 144, at 187.
147 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 136 (July 9).
148 U.N. Charter art 27(3) (“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by 
an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided 
that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain 
from voting.”).
149 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J., 
supra note 134, at 22 (emphasis added).
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was not initially engaged in the Council’s interpretive exercise of defining 
what constitutes a concurring vote. 
The key point from this analysis is that the membership is vested with 
authority to interpret the U.N. Charter, but this may manifest in different 
ways and, moreover, at differing rates of rapidity. Uniquely, the Assembly 
comprises the entire U.N. membership. It thus has the capacity to crystallise 
an accepted interpretation of the U.N. Charter in a much more direct form 
than the other organs, who rely on the more laborious process of showing 
acquiescence from the general membership over time.150 When members 
vote for an Assembly resolution, they are necessarily asserting or implying a 
position relative to one or more legal propositions raised. 151 They are 
claiming that the Assembly has the competence to act in the manner it 
intended in the resolution. Unlike the other organs, the Assembly is 
therefore able, if the political will exists, to render an accepted interpretation
of the U.N. Charter with unusual rapidity. Where this is the case, action 
taken with the active support of a significant majority of states is not ultra 
vires but rather reflects the powers of the Assembly within a dynamic 
constitutional system. 152
Still, the basic objection to this argument is that the Assembly could, 
in a single resolution such as UfP, authoritatively interpret the scope of its 
implied powers.  To accept that a single resolution can generate a 
constitutional power would be akin to finding that the Assembly is a
legislative body. Indeed, a proposal by the Philippine delegation conferring 
legislative powers on the Assembly was rejected during the drafting of the 
U.N. Charter.153 Rather, there is a need for significant persistent recitation 
of a resolution to evince members’ intent. 154 Thus, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights attained the status of customary international 
law not because of its affirmation in a single resolution but because of its 
recitation in subsequent resolutions.155 Members should not be held to their 
150 But see Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 83, at 237 (citing the original intention of the drafters to 
exclude the Assembly’s power of “authentic” interpretation).
151 Schachter, supra note 144, at 176.
152 Salo Engel, Procedures for the De Facto Revision of the Charter, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 108, 112–13 (1965).
153 Journal no. 18 of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (May 15, 
1945), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945, 64, 64 (1998).
154 See Samuel A. Bleicher, Legal Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 
AM. J. INT’L L. 444, 457 (1969).
155 Id.
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vote on resolutions that they regarded as meaningless or subject to 
change: there should be no obstacle to a “change of heart” by members.156
Under this reasoning, a single resolution by the Assembly authorising
coercive action would be insufficient to establish a constitutional power. 
A resolution’s interpretive significance will turn on whether it is 
reasonable to expect the state to remain faithful to its vote in the future.157
The issue is not whether an Assembly recommendation is binding, but 
whether it evinces sufficient evidence from the U.N. general membership as 
to the scope of the Assembly’s constitutional powers. The legal significance 
of a resolution will depend on the language employed, its motives, and the 
general context that led to its passage.158 The context of the deadlock over 
Korea in 1950 constituted, to borrow a phrase, a “Grotian moment” that
brought into focus the acute need for constitutional realignment, meaning 
that the Assembly resolution was to be taken as representing the members’ 
accepted interpretation of the power of the Assembly to recommend 
coercive measures.159 That the vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the 
resolution (fifty-two to five, with two abstentions) further supports its 
certification as an accepted interpretation of the Assembly’s powers under 
the U.N. Charter. Similarly, if the Assembly were to recommend coercive 
measures in the form of a humanitarian intervention to avert serious human
rights abuse, the votes of members would be taken to represent their 
categorical view as to the powers of the Assembly. This conclusion would 
be further enhanced were the Assembly to debate the constitutionality of any 
proposed measure, emphasizing that the membership accepted the 
significance of their Assembly vote. Therefore, even a single resolution 
affirming the Assembly’s coercive power, given the solemnity of the context 
and its constitutional significance, would constitute an accepted 
interpretation of the powers of the Assembly under the U.N. Charter.
This leads to the second criticism of majoritarian constitution 
making—that such an approach holds minorities to a constitutional 
interpretation they do not support. More fundamentally, this majoritarian 
conception essentially subjects legal text to a political process, where any 
156 Id. at 453–57.
157 Id. at 446–53. 
158 Id. at 477. 
159 The phrase “Grotian moment” here is borrowed from a theory that customary international law 
may emerge rapidly where the context permits.  See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (2013).
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resolution is legally validated no matter how far removed it is from the 
language of the Charter and the originally attributed powers of the organ. 
Thus, the principle of state consent is not “frontally assaulted but cunningly 
outflanked.”160 It is true that the Assembly could endorse a course of action 
that is ultra vires. The validity of an act by an organ rests with the members 
themselves, with their assent validating an act that is otherwise 
unconstitutional.161 However, concerns may be raised that the powers of the 
Assembly are open to abuse where there is too much constitutional latitude 
for change. This is inevitably a concern within a dynamic constitutional 
system where the locus of power is the membership itself, but there are still 
reasons to be optimistic that the Assembly will capably provide its own 
customary checks and balances, particularly given its universal and diverse 
composition. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Assembly debate in 1950 on 
UfP represented a wide spectrum of viewpoints, with the ultimate 
justification for UfP not deriving from a crude argument of unfettered power
but based on a close teleological reading of the U.N. Charter and the 
adoption of an interpretation that fell within a spectrum of reasonable 
interpretive possibilities.162
Further, the criticism that minority-voting members are held to the 
legal effect of resolutions against their will can be persuasively addressed. 
The requirement of member unanimity remains an important mechanism for 
constitutional reform in many international organisations, but the U.N.
Charter explicitly departs from this principle. This was necessary because 
otherwise a single state would effectively hold veto power over the U.N.’s 
constitutional development, which is problematic with a near universal 
membership. 163 The inclusion of majoritarian decision-making is thus 
underpinned by the need for the U.N. Charter to be effective in achieving its 
purposes, the same teleological assumption supporting the Assembly’s 
strong UfP powers. Thus, both the Council and Assembly can act where 
there is majority support.164 An amendment to the U.N. Charter does not 
160 Prosper Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 438 
(1983).
161 Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations, in CAMBRIDGE 
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR 88, 120 (1965).
162 For an analysis, see J. Andrassy, supra note 57.
163 C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
419 (1996).
164 U.N. Charter arts. 18, 27 (supporting the conclusion that, of course, there must also be permanent 
member unanimity for Council decisions). 
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require unanimity but rather requires a two-thirds majority.165 By analogy, 
Michael Akehurst argued that if a large number of members in the minority 
could unsuccessfully oppose an amendment, then it must follow that the 
distillation of a constitutional power could be supported with similar voting 
outcomes.166 Furthermore, the ICJ has never insisted upon unanimity when 
evaluating the relevance of subsequent practice to determining members’ 
agreement, noting in the Namibia Advisory Opinion that the practice at issue 
“has been generally accepted . . . .”167 It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that U.N. members accepted the possibility that subsequent interpretations 
may not be ones that they preferred.168
That said, one potential hurdle to an Assembly resolution having 
constitutional effects concerns the actual size of the majority. The argument 
above is premised on members expressing their will through the Assembly 
as to the scope of this organ’s powers. However, this premise is undermined 
where the technical majority achieved for a resolution does not significantly 
represent the will of the membership. Under Article 18(2) of the U.N.
Charter, an Assembly resolution only requires the affirmative votes of two-
thirds of those “present and voting,” and not the membership as a whole. 
The legal or legitimising value of a resolution that only has the support of a 
small number of members would “tend towards zero.”169 This is a valid 
point, in that an interpretation of the U.N. Charter would require the support 
of a significant number of members for it to be accepted. An actual two-
thirds majority of U.N. members, rather than a technical majority, is 
therefore required.170
C. Constitutional Controls on the Assembly’s UfP Powers
A compelling case may therefore be made for strong UfP, grounded in 
the doctrine of implied powers and a teleological interpretation of the U.N.’s 
foundational documents. Nonetheless, questions remain about the scope of 
UfP and the legal considerations that the Assembly should take into account 
165 U.N. Charter art. 1
166 Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, in THE BRITISH YEAR 
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1974–1975 273, 278 (1977).
167 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 22 (1970).
168 Bleicher, supra note 154, at 449. See also Anthony D’Amato, On Consensus, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT’L
L. 104, 121–22 (1970).
169 Talmon, supra note 24, at 10.
170 Abstentions may also be construed as an acquiescence to the terms of the resolution given that any 
objection could have been expressed in a negative vote. See Bleicher, supra note 154 at 449. 
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when recommending coercive measures. As there is limited UfP practice in 
this area, and none in the context of humanitarian intervention, this paper 
suggests a possible legal framework, which may provide guidance for the 
future application of UfP to questions of humanitarian intervention.
1. Council Trigger for UfP
The first consideration is what role the Council should perform under 
UfP. The Assembly may act where the Council has failed in its primary 
responsibility, but the UfP specifies that the Council may request that the 
Assembly convene an emergency special session.171 The UfP resolution also 
triggers the Assembly’s consideration of a situation where a majority of 
U.N. members make such a request. While either the Assembly or Council 
may trigger the UfP procedure, there is good reason, grounded in practice, 
for the Council to make this determination. 
First, to do so respects the language of Article 12 of the U.N. Charter 
in that the Council’s request would constitute a certification that it is no 
longer “exercising” its functions on a particular situation.172 This would 
provide the Assembly with a broad constitutional mandate to make 
appropriate recommendations. By respecting the Council’s right to trigger 
UfP, harmony will be maintained between the two organs.173 If the Council 
made such a request, it would amount to a procedural vote, and thus would 
not be subject to the veto of the permanent members. Under Article 27(2), a 
procedural matter does not require unanimity, but a qualified majority of 
Council members (nine out of fifteen). The interpretation of such a vote as a 
procedural matter is reinforced by the organization of the U.N. Charter, 
which places a request by the Security Council for the Assembly to convene 
a special session under the section labelled “Procedure.”174
Second, as the Assembly would be taking coercive measures in 
recommending humanitarian intervention it is necessary to find that a 
situation constitutes a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression” under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. The Assembly could very 
well arrive at this determination itself as a necessary prerequisite to acting 
under UfP. Indeed, the Assembly has characterised situations as such in 
171 G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 13. 
172 Carswell, supra note 16, at 469–70.
173 Tomuschat, supra note 64.
174 U.N. Charter art. 20. 
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many resolutions.175 But given that the Council is empowered to make a 
determination under this provision, where it makes a request to the 
Assembly it is implicitly qualifying the situation as one in which coercive 
measures may be taken.176 This would not only buttress the Assembly’s 
power to recommend enforcement action but ensure that there is inter-organ 
consensus that a situation qualifies for such measures being taken. 
Third, practice establishes the Council’s integral role in triggering the 
UfP mechanism where armed forces are to be engaged. Thus, it was the 
Council who first made the request to the Assembly with respect to major 
conflicts, both international (Korea, Suez, Hungary, and Afghanistan) and 
internal (Congo). 177 By contrast, the Assembly invoked UfP without a 
Council request only in non-conflict situations, such as the process of 
decolonisation and the question concerning Palestinian statehood.178 The 
established practice of the Council triggering the UfP procedures in conflict 
situations provides an effective check on the Assembly. This does not mean, 
however, that the Assembly is unable to invoke UfP of their own volition. 
Ultimately, the Assembly has control over its agenda, but to assume
jurisdiction it must assess whether the Council has failed to exercise its 
primary responsibility.179 But the involvement of the Council in requesting 
Assembly action serves to address any lingering (albeit unfounded) concerns 
that the Council is being constitutionally usurped, further legitimating the 
process and ensuring it has support of at least some permanent members, 
which may be necessary to ensure successful action. 
2. Predicates to Assembly Action Under UfP
The Assembly may act in instances where, “because of lack of 
unanimity of the permanent members, [the Council] fails to exercise its 
primary responsibility.”180 There are two conditions: that the veto has been 
exercised, and that this results in the Council “failing” to exercise its primary 
responsibility. 181 Therefore, not all negative decisions will justify the 
175 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2107 (XX), ¶ 7 (1965).
176 Carswell, supra note 16, at 466.
177 Petersen, supra note 15, at 224, 226, 228.
178 See Zaum, supra note 64, at 155. 
179 Andrassy, supra note 57, at 578.
180 G.A. Res. 377, supra note 13, at ¶ 1.
181 Carswell, supra note 16, at 469. 
 
                                                        
300 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 2
 
invocation of UfP, the veto being a legitimate Charter technique to prevent 
the overregulation of international peace and security.182
A narrow approach in determining Council “failure” is to apply the 
abuse of rights doctrine, which requires that the right-holders (permanent 
members) not use their veto in a manner that causes harm to the 
community.183 An abuse may be manifested where a decision is arbitrary, 
taken for an extraneous purpose, or in bad faith.184 The language of “abuse”
captures the moral impetus and discourse of recent condemnations of 
Council vetoes.185 However, finding abuse is likely to prove elusive. To be 
sure, permanent members have vetoed resolutions for extraneous purposes.
The United States vetoed the extension of peacekeeping mandates in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina because it had not received a concession in the drafting of 
the ICC Statute. 186 Similarly, China ended a peacekeeping operation in
Macedonia, apparently because Yugoslavia recognised Taiwan’s 
statehood.187 These decisions pursued purposes that were extraneous to that 
of collective peace and security.188 However, most negative votes are, at 
least ostensibly, connected to the Council’s broad purposes, with 
disagreement between the permanent members focused on the appropriate 
measures to take. When China and Russia vetoed a Council resolution on 
Syria, they did so on the basis that U.N. action would be 
counterproductive.189 Similarly, in vetoing a referral to the ICC, Russia 
cautioned this measure would throw “oil to the fire” during on-going 
182 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 262 
(1994); Phillipa Webb, Deadlock or Restraint? The Security Council Veto and the Use of Force in Syria, 19 
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 471, 486 (2014).
183 Competence of General Assembly for Admission of State to United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1950 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 15 (Mar. 3) (dissenting opinion by M. Alvarez, who first spoke of abuse of rights by the 
Council in the context of the veto).  See also Carswell, supra note 16, at 470–71; BARDO FASSBENDER,
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 174–75 
(1998). 
184 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 2 (obligating members to act in “good faith”); Id. art. 24, ¶ 2 (requires 
the Council to “act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,” which may 
reasonably include abuse of rights as a general principle of law); Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old 
Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389 (2002).  
185 ICISS REPORT, supra note 5, at 34. 
186 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4363d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4363 (Aug. 31, 2001); U.N. SCOR, 
Official Communiqué of the 4567th (Closed) Meeting of the Security Council, 56th Sess., 4567th mtg., 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4567 (July 8, 2002).
187 Marc Weller, Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the International 
Criminal Court, 78 INT’L AFF. 693, 706 (2002).
188 Id.
189 U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6711th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6711 (Feb. 4, 2012).
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hostilities in Syria.190 The notion that these permanent members abused 
their rights rather than acting in pursuit of international security may be 
difficult to objectively ascertain. 
A better approach is to find “failure” where a proposed Council 
resolution was vetoed in a given situation despite evidence of the risk or 
existence of serious human rights abuse. Using human rights abuse as a 
trigger for UfP is acceptable because while the Council has primary 
responsibility for peace and security, the Assembly enjoys primacy in the 
promotion of human rights under the U.N. Charter. 191 The Assembly’s 
central role in promoting human rights is reinforced by the ICJ’s Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory advisory opinion, which notes that while the “Council has tended 
to focus on the aspects of such matters related to international peace and 
security, the General Assembly has taken a broader view, considering also 
their humanitarian, social and economic aspects.”192 Indeed, it is apparent 
from many Assembly resolutions that there is an underlying concern about 
the human consequences of conflict. 193 This is generally in contrast to 
practice during the Cold War, where UfP was utilised in response to inter-
state acts of aggression and occupation.194 This narrower approach not only 
provides a suitable fit with the Assembly’s primary humanitarian functions, 
but may also carry greater political appeal to those states who contemplate 
spearheading a UfP resolution but who perceive it to be a “double-edged 
sword.”195
However, UfP contemplates the Assembly acting where there has 
been a “breach of the peace” in contrast to a “threat to the peace.” This is 
material, as on the few occasions that the Council characterised a situation as 
a “breach of the peace,” the situation involved inter-state hostilities or use of 
force by a de facto regime against a state.196 As noted above, this definition 
thus excludes intra-state situations of the type that engage with the 
190 G.A. Res. 66/253B, supra note 8. 
191 See U.N. Charter art. 1; U.N. Charter art. 13, ¶ 1; U.N. Charter art. 55; U.N. Charter art. 60.
192 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 150 (July 9) (emphasis added). 
193 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1104 (Dec. 18, 1956) (noting that the “intervention of Soviet military forces in 
Hungary has resulted in grave loss of life and widespread bloodshed among the Hungarian people” and 
calling for cooperation in providing humanitarian aid).
194 White, Relationship Between, supra note 49, at 309.  See also U.N. Charter art. 13, ¶ 1(b); art. 55. 
195 See Carswell, supra note 16, at 455–56.
196 S.C. Res. 502 (Apr. 3, 1982); S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 82 (June 25, 1950). 
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humanitarian intervention doctrine.197 The view that this justifiably places 
limits on the Assembly’s powers is misplaced. The term “breach of the 
peace” is broad enough to encompass internal situations.198 The difference 
between these terms is one of degree, as a threat may mature into a breach. 
There must be evidence of a breach, as opposed to a reasonable belief that a 
given state of affairs threatens to become one. How this manifests itself in a 
situation of grave human rights abuse is open for interpretation, and as with 
Council determinations on such matters, the discretion to identify a breach 
must rest with the Assembly itself.199
There exists a great deal of convergence in the international 
community as to the types of human rights abuses that warrant intervention.
The responsibility to protect (RtoP) doctrine supports measures to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing.200 Similarly, the British and French would justify intervention 
where there is evidence of “overwhelming human catastrophe” or “mass
atrocity” respectively.201 Of course, there could be some penumbra of doubt 
as to when a situation qualifies as a grave human rights abuse. Yet while 
problems of scope and intensity remain, RtoP offers sufficient criteria of 
seriousness to avoid or mitigate abusive invocation of human rights as 
justification for unlawful intervention. 202 The most important issue is 
whether the entity applying such standards is capable of doing so in an
objective and principled way. 
The problem is not with the principle, but with the application. The 
World Summit in 2005 endorsed RtoP, but in practice the doctrine has 
stumbled because of disagreement over the suitability of measures to address 
such crises. Ultimately, however, the shortcomings of RtoP have arisen
because its locus of operation has been within the Council where the 
disagreement of a single permanent member could result in deadlock. While 
there may be merit in placing limits on the regulation of international peace 
197 Christian Henderson, Authority without Accountability? The UN Security Council’s Authorization 
Method and Institutional Mechanisms of Accountability, 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 489, 507 (2014).
198 Jochen A. Frowein, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts 
of Aggression, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, 605, 609 (Bruno Simma et al. 
eds., 1995).
199 ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 139–40
(2004) (the Council has broad latitude under Article 39).
200 See ICISS REPORT, supra note 5. 
201 Id. at 33; see also Johnson, supra note 23. 
202 Rodley, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 38, at 777.
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and security, the application of UfP to humanitarian crises would not 
necessarily mean an increase in U.N. enforcement action. The same 
arguments made by China and Russia to block further measures in Syria 
could equally resonate in a failed Assembly resolution. 203 Indeed, the 
political environment would have to be such that states contemplating a 
humanitarian intervention feel assured of wide support in the Assembly—a 
level of formal support that Council- or region-led operations, with their 
much smaller number of voting members, could never have. The notion that 
the U.N. would become involved in more enforcement actions with a liberal 
interpretation of powers under the U.N. Charter belies the political 
complexity in organising and securing a consensus, and also the
exceptionality of using military force. But in instances of large-scale human 
rights abuse that shock the conscience of the international community, 
coupled with Council inaction, the UfP mechanism provides legal 
justification for the Assembly to make recommendations up to and including 
the use of force under a U.N. mandate. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Through the lens of the humanitarian intervention doctrine, this article
argued that Assembly resolutions may acquire certain legal effects, in turn 
presenting the Assembly as a viable alternative to the Council in augmenting 
collective responses to security crises. In particular, it was noted that 
Assembly resolutions serve as an aid in determining members’ general 
agreement as to the scope of this organ’s powers under the U.N. Charter. No
U.N. organ has interpretive supremacy, it being incumbent on each organ, in 
the first instance at least, to define its own jurisdictional scope. When the 
Assembly passes a resolution, its members thus implicitly assert a legal 
claim as to the scope of the organ’s powers. The legal claim may be that 
such resolutions are purely hortatory, as is commonplace in practice. But 
equally, Assembly members have constitutional licence to interpret the 
organ’s powers more broadly, such as to recognise an implied power to
authorise enforcement action, as the Assembly did in 1950 under the UfP
mechanism.  It may be that the members’ legal claim on the Assembly’s 
jurisdictional scope is not always clearly articulated within a resolution, thus 
necessitating recitation and affirmation in subsequent resolutions. But 
where the intention of a resolution is clear, and it obtains the support of a 
203 See Russia and China Veto Draft Security Council Resolution on Syria, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 
4, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39935#.VpyIKPkrLIV.
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substantial majority of U.N. members via consensual procedures, it 
constitutes an accepted interpretation of the Assembly’s powers under the 
U.N. Charter. 
Furthermore, Assembly resolutions pursuant to UfP may delegate 
enforcement authority to willing states acting under a U.N. mandate. Here 
the legal effect of the resolution is primarily internal, by specifying the 
nature and extent of the authority that is subject to delegation, but there is 
also some extrinsic effect to the resolution, in that it provides a legal 
justification for action that would otherwise contravene international law. 
The “authorising” quality of a UfP resolution serves to bring the contributing 
state, now acting under a U.N. mandate, into a special legal regime, and not 
subject to specific obligations under Article 2(4) that would otherwise 
prevent it from using force. 
Establishing that Assembly resolutions have such legal effect is 
necessary in order for the Assembly to effectively assume responsibility for 
international peace and security in the event of a Council deadlock.
Whereas the Council expressly possesses mandatory and coercive powers 
that facilitate its regulation of international security, a more creative and 
teleological approach is necessary when fashioning the Assembly’s implied 
powers. The U.N. Charter is sufficiently vague for varied interpretations as 
to the scope of powers and purposes. However, it has been argued here that 
these questions of interpretive disagreement are ultimately vested with the 
membership to resolve through consensual procedures.  Through UfP, the 
membership has the capacity to assert its views in varying degrees where the 
Council has failed to maintain international peace and security. 
This inevitably leads to the question of whether such a bold assertion
of power will ever materialise again. This article focused on technical 
aspects of the acquired legal effects of Assembly resolutions, but in doing so 
it revealed that interpretation is itself underpinned by a normative 
commitment to a given conception of collective security. Engaging in a 
teleological interpretation of the U.N. Charter brings into sharp focus the
question of not just what the organization was established to do but what it 
ought to do in response to contemporary security concerns. The U.N.
Charter has proved remarkably adaptable to changing circumstances in 
international politics, from the growth of Assembly competencies during the 
Cold War to the reawakening of an extraordinarily powerful Council 
thereafter. From initially conceiving of collective security as a mechanism 
to repel acts of aggression, it is now safe to say that collective security is 
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also defined by its ability to ensure respect for and the protection of human 
rights. With a shift in paradigms, it is not inconceivable that the Assembly, 
realigning UfP to address humanitarian crises instead of Cold War acts of 
aggression, could obtain sufficient support to act on behalf of the collective 
security community to recommend measures up to and including the use of 
force. 
The attainment of collective security continually raises questions of 
legality and legitimacy, sometimes in dichotomous terms. That the NATO 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was of doubtful legality was arguably 
excused because it was seen as legitimate. The clear legal basis of the arrest 
warrant for Al-Bashir, underpinned by a Council decision, did not prevent 
trenchant criticism from African states over the International Criminal 
Court’s legitimacy. The undoubted legal basis for China and Russia to veto 
a referral of Syrian atrocities to the ICC did not prevent widespread 
condemnation in the international community of the Council’s vote.  But the 
UfP mechanism, when properly used and supported by a consensus of U.N.
members, holds the promise of promoting both legality and legitimacy in the 
attainment of collective security objectives that would otherwise be 
unreachable due to Council deadlock.    
 
